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Essays
Early Modern Rights Talk
Victoria Kahn*
Modem historians of political thought, legal historians, critical legal
theorists, and others regularly look to the seventeenth century as the
"classic" period of rights talk, the period which shaped the development of
all subsequent liberal political theory. Thus, scholars as diverse as Carole
Pateman, Ian Shapiro, John Rawls, and Mary Ann Glendon have taken the
seventeenth century as their point of departure in evaluating the role of
rights in modem liberal theory. The same is true of older scholars, such as
Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson, not to mention the numerous
historians of political thought for whom Hobbes and Locke mark the
beginning of the liberal tradition.' Although this list of strange bedfellows
would seem to suggest a considerable divergence of opinion about what
transpired in the seventeenth century, there is in fact surprising agreement
* Victoria Kahn is Professor of English and Comparative Literature at UC Berkeley.
1. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT (1988); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF
RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY (1986); LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1950); C. B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
See also POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (D. D. Raphael ed., 1967); and, more recently,
A CULTURE OF RIGHTS (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
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about the emergence of a proto-liberal conception of the rights-bearing
individual and of individual consent to political contract as the basis of
political legitimacy. Ernst Bloch articulated the scholarly consensus in
Natural Law and Human Dignity when he described the most important
feature of the new language of rights as "the belief that individuals
constitute and preserve social life." These individuals are the possessors of
"private rights," which
cannot be violated except under the one condition that the individual
consents to let this happen out of what he considers his own best
interest. It was a juridical rather than a historical concept that led to
the view that a just state could not be thought of except as the product
of the will of its members.2
All of the above named scholars have argued that our ways of thinking
and talking about rights are still shaped in part by the "classic" early
modern discussions of the rights-bearing individual. Perhaps more
surprising, all are agreed that this formative influence has been harmful-
although for different reasons. Some, like Leo Strauss (who can stand here
for a long line of politically conservative critics), have argued that the
seventeenth-century discourse of individual rights ushered in the
historicism and relativism of the modern age.' Others, like C. B.
Macpherson (who can stand for a long line of Marxist-inspired critics),
have argued that the rights-bearing individual of the seventeenth-century,
the individual who in Locke's words has "property in his person," was
modeled on the protocapitalist economy of the seventeenth century, and
that this conception of rights has had a deleterious influence on subsequent
liberal attempts to think about justice, especially just distribution.4 The
feminist political theorist Carole Pateman extended Macpherson's
argument to gender, claiming that the liberal language of rights and social
contract is essentially the same as patriarchal models of political
obligation: the language of rights simply obscures-and thus helps to
preserve-inequitable relations of power.5 More recently, and from a
much more socially conservative communitarian perspective, Mary Ann
Glendon has attacked the "possessive individualism" of the early modem
period, arguing that rights talk, then and now, imagines the individual as
prior to the community and fosters a conflict regarding rights to scarce
resources rather than encouraging us to think of our responsibilities to our
fellow citizens.6 Finally, and taking a somewhat different tack, Ian Shapiro
2. ERNST BLOCH, NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY 54 (Dennis J. Schmidt trans., MIT Press
1986)(1961).
3. See generally LEO STRAUSS, supra note 1.
4. See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 1; BLOCH, supra note 2; SHAPIRO, supra note 1.
5. See generally PATEMAN, supra note 1.
6. See generally GLENDON, supra note 1.
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has argued that the early modem language of rights was far more coherent
than modem liberal rights talk, because it was informed by certain
epistemological and religious convictions that most of us no longer share.
In Hobbes, Locke, and many of their contemporaries, rights talk was
underpinned by a theory of objective interests and (in the case of Locke
and others) divine will, that constrained the rampant pursuit of self-interest
and made seventeenth-century rights talk immune to the objections of
relativism-to which modem liberalism is vulnerable. In contrast,
according to Shapiro, the individualism, even monadism, of Rawls and
Nozick is indefensible: an anachronistic throw-back to early modem
thought without early modem presuppositions, and thus an inadequate
way of talking about rights in an age of globalism.7 Thus all of the critics I
have mentioned suggest that we need to know more about the underlying
assumptions of early modem views so we can see how their current
influence is unwarranted-so we can see how inappropriate they are to our
own very different time and society.
I would like to concede both the influence of this version of early
modem rights talk and its problematic relevance to modem debates, and
still argue that there is something of positive value in the seventeenth-
century language of rights that bears on contemporary discussion. And
that is the insight, for all the debate about "natural rights" in this period,
that rights are discursive--derived by rational deliberation and
discussion-even, we might say, linguistically constituted. Despite their
interest in the early modem period, none of the contemporary critics I
have mentioned has anything to say about the "talk" part of seventeenth-
century "rights talk." And yet it is arguably this discursive focus-the
awareness on the part of some seventeenth-century writers that language
as a set of conventions could serve as a model for rights-that is of
greatest relevance to modem discussions of rights.8 An account of early
modem "rights talk" as opposed to "rights theory" would then focus not
simply on discussions of rights in this period, but rather on discussions of
rights as a matter of talk. In order to appreciate this point, we need to
backtrack a few steps and say something about the historical context of the
language of rights in the early modem period.
Rights talk emerged in the seventeenth century in response to what we
might call a crisis of legitimation, an overlapping set of political crises
involving religious and civil wars and international conflict.9 This crisis
7. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 1.
8. On rights as rational conventions, see Thomas Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk
in the "Age of Interpretation," 74 J. Am. HIST. 984 (1987).
9. The secondary literature on the evolution of the concept of rights is enormous. For accounts
that stress the originality of seventeenth-century theories of natural rights, see KNUD HAAKONSSEN,
NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996); J. B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF
AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1998); SHAPIRO, supra note 1; RICHARD
TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT, 1572-1651 (1993). For dissenting views, see BRIAN
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was moral and epistemological as well. In contrast to those late scholastics
who explained the binding force of agreements in terms of the Aristotelian
virtues of promise-keeping, liberality, and commutative justice,
seventeenth-century English and continental Protestant writers were
operating in a world in which such Aristotelian assumptions were no
longer taken for granted.'0 The task of political thinkers and jurists was to
find a new way of talking about obligation and binding agreements in the
absence of religious and political consensus. In one common account of
the discursive shift in this period, the language of law replaced that of
virtue."' But this formulation does not do justice to the sophisticated early
modern reflection on the linguistic dimension of rights, reflection that was
itself generated by the search for a common language of obligation. Along
with rights, I argue, language took center stage. In particular, language as
a conventional system of signs was seen to be the precondition and model
for the articulation of early modern rights.
In the following account of rights talk I focus on Hugo Grotius's De
jure belli ac pacis (1625) and Samuel Pufendorf's De jure naturae et
gentium (1672).12 Now read as a classic of international law, Grotius's
work is by most accounts the first important example of the new rights
talk; Pufendorf was an admirer of both Grotius and Hobbes and, in the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an extremely influential theorist of
natural rights. Both authors offer an account of political association
predicated on the individual transfer of natural rights to a sovereign, and
both must accordingly explain why individuals should and do keep their
promises of obedience, their political contracts.
As in all early modern theories of political contract, Grotius and
Pufendorf waver between voluntarism and rationalism, between
emphasizing the role of the individual's will and consent in legitimating
political rule and the role of reason in conforming to already existing
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES IN NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND
CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997); Johann Sommerville, From Suarez to Filmer: A Reappraisal, 25
HIST. J. 525 (1982). Tierney locates the decisive shift towards a subjective notion of rights in the
twelfth century rather than the seventeenth, although he also stresses that medieval rights theory did
not focus on the individual in the same way early modem rights theory does. I am most persuaded by
the accounts of Haakonssen, Schneewind, Shapiro, and Tuck.
10. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
(199 1). For some scholars of this period, including Gordley, the absence of Aristotelian or Thomist
metaphysics means that contract theory (then and now) is doomed to incoherence. I want to suggest, in
contrast, that both then and now incoherence is not the only alternative to Aristotle. Late sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century men and women were grappling in their own way with a crisis of
foundationalism and many were attempting self-consciously to forge a new basis of social and
political obligation, in which language had an important normative role to play.
II. See, e.g., SCHNEEWIND, supra note 9, at 76.
12. I cite from the following editions: HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES
(James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (Walter Simons ed., C. H. & W. A. Oldfather
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standards of justice. 3 In the first case, they focus on subjective natural
rights, in the second on objective natural law. In the first case, the
argument for keeping one's promises tends to be prudential and pragmatic,
in the second, moral or theological. But there is a midpoint between these
extremes, and that is the argument that language itself provides a basis for
rights talk that is neither theologically determined nor merely prudential
and self-interested. In both Grotius and Pufendorf, this kind of rights talk
takes three forms: the quotation of previous discourses about rights; the
argument that the political contract is analogous to, and founded on, a
prior linguistic contract; and the suggestion that the constructive power of
language is itself constitutive of rights. No one of these arguments
logically dictates the others, nor are they in all respects consistent with
each other or with the presupposition of an objective natural law. But
together they show the effort on the part of at least two important early
modern theorists to take language into account in the formation and
articulation of rights.
We can begin to get a sense of the discursive occasion and motive for
early modern rights talk by turning to the Prolegomena of Grotius's De
jure belli ac pacis. Here Grotius explains his reasons for writing:
Fully convinced.., that there is a common law among nations,
which is valid alike for war and in war, I have had many and weighty
reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject. Throughout the
Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such
as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men
rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms
have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine
or human. 4
As though to emphasize the occasion of conflict, Grotius makes
controversiae (controversies) the first word of chapter one. To the early
modern reader, the word "controversiae" would have conjured up not only
contemporary religious and political controversies but also rhetorical
exercises training students to argue on both sides of a question (as in the
elder Seneca's Controversiae), thereby emphasizing the inextricability of
discursive and political conflict. Grotius then goes on to argue, from
common linguistic usage, that "war" has come to mean "not a contest but
a condition,"' 5 just as Hobbes would argue in Leviathan.16 It was in
13. See PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1982); SHAPIRO, supra note 1,
especially part 11; JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS
(1993), especially ch. 9.
14. GROTIUS, Prolegomnena, in DE JURE BELLI, supra note 12, at para. 28.
15. GROTIUS, supranote 12, atbk. 1.ch. l, andbk. 1,ch. 2,§§ 1-2.
16. "For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time,
wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (165 1). SCHNEEWIND, supra note 9, at 72, also notes
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response to this condition that Grotius, like Hobbes and Pufendorf, turned
to natural law. Natural law seemed to offer a point of convergence or
agreement for the otherwise competing interests of individuals or nations,
a lowest common denominator. An important part of this new minimalism
was the focus on subjective rights. In Grotius and others, natural rights
were a subset of natural law. 7 Whereas natural law referred to an
objective order, natural right referred to subjective faculties and powers-
such as the freedom to defend oneself and one's property. Along with our
natural sociability, the natural right of self-preservation seemed to provide
a particularly compelling motive for political obligation.
What was the rhetorical force of the language of rights and what sorts of
argument did this language itself promote? In some cases, the power of the
new language of rights lay in the fact that it was ahistorical-and thus a
way of wrenching consensus from historically embedded conflicts and
traditional but contested legitimations of authority. This was the rhetorical
function of the state of nature and of the description of rights as "natural."
Natural rights were opposed to divine right, feudal rights and obligations,
traditional notions of hierarchy and authority, historical custom and
consensus. 8 Thus Grotius goes out of his way to distinguish natural law
and natural right from historically variable positive law, whether in an
individual country or in the law of nations. The discussion of natural law
can only be made systematic, he tells us, if it is divorced from positive
law:
For the principles of the law of nature, since they are always the
same, can easily be brought into a systematic form; but the elements
of positive law, since they often undergo change and are different in
different places, are outside the domain of systematic treatment. 19
But in other cases (or, in the case of Grotius, in other places), natural
rights alone or both natural law and natural rights were linked to history.
At times Grotius argues that whereas natural law is absolute, natural rights
are relative and historical: they come into being in-and help to
negotiate-the postlapsarian, historical existence of individuals and
nations. At other times, while insisting that the law of nature is always and
everywhere the same, Grotius allows that it encompasses things that are
created by human volition. As an example, he cites the notion of
ownership. Once ownership has been historically introduced by human
agreement, it is wrong according to natural law to take someone's
that controversiae is the first word of chapter one in De jure belli.
17. Hobbes is an exception, deriving natural laws hypothetically from natural rights. See HOBBES,
supra note 16, at chs. 14, 15.
18. The issue of custom is complicated since, for example, in England the customary language of
the ancient constitution was linked to that of natural rights.
19. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 30. See also id. at paras. 39-41; Grotius, supra note 12, at bk.
1, ch. 1, § 10 (discussing how the law of nature is different from the law of nations).
[Vol. 13:391
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property without his consent.2°
This entwining of natural law and history was enshrined in Grotius's
response to the question of how to prove the existence of the law of
nature. This may be done either a priori by matching human behavior to
natural law or-the easier way-a posteriori, by considering what natural
law has been thought to be "among all nations, or among all those that are
most advanced in civilization."'" The linking of natural law and natural
rights to history then mandates a particular kind of rights talk. As anybody
knows who has dipped into them, Grotius's De jure belli ac pacis and
Pufendorf's De jure naturae et gentium offer encyclopaedic, proto-
anthropological investigations of rights talk from antiquity to the
seventeenth century. Drawing on "the testimony of philosophers,
historians, poets, [and] orators, 22 they introduce the reader to the customs
of ancient Roman worship, penal law, polygamy, and slave contracts. But
along with such historical examples, the reader of Grotius and Pufendorf
would take away a methodological lesson as well. In these texts, any claim
regarding the universality of rights is supported not simply by reference to
a divinely authored natural law, but also by a wide array of historically
and culturally disparate examples from classical and contemporary texts,
suggesting that we can only know which rights are "natural" by knowing
what people have historically made or said of them. Customs-and
customary ways of speaking-are thus not simply opposed to natural laws,
but evidence of their historical instantiation. This, then, is the first way in
which we should construe early modem "rights talk." 3
The second way we should understand "rights talk" has to do with the
analogy between the political contract and what I have called the linguistic
contract. For many early modem authors, natural rights were the basis of
the political contract.24 According to this argument, individuals have
natural rights of self-preservation and dominion which they consent to
transfer to the sovereign in exchange for protection, security, and what
Hobbes called "commodious living." This exchange of protection for
20. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 1, ch. 1, § 10.4.
21. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 1, §12.1
22. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 40.
23. See GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 1, ch. 1, § 12 (use of quotations as proof); see also
GROTIUS, supra note 14, at paras. 40, 46. For a good discussion of the tension in DE JURE BELLI
between arguments from natural law and arguments from positive law and local custom, see Jane 0.
Newman, "Race, "Religion, and the Law: Rhetorics of Sameness and Difference in the Work of Hugo
Grotius, in RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 285 (Victoria Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds.,
2001).
24. In the following pages, the term "social contract" refers to the contract individuals enter into
with each other to form society; the "political contract" is the contract between those members of
society and the sovereign. The two are usually analytically distinct in seventeenth-century discussions
of political obligation, with the language of contract being used most often to refer to the political
contract. Hobbes is the exception to the distinction between society and the political contract: With the
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obedience was the essence of the political contract. Such a contract
prompted the obvious question: Why do individuals remain bound by it
when the sovereign appears to act contrary to their interests? Why should
and do they keep their promises? From antiquity onwards, one answer to
this question was that we are morally obliged to do so by the divine and
natural law that "promises must be kept" (pacta servanda sunt), as well as
by the implicit sanction of divine punishment. But in the seventeenth
century, this answer was very often supplemented by another, which
involved an analysis of the mechanism of promising and of the social
conventions-the social contract-of language. Beginning with the
assumption that language is a distinctively human capacity which is
essential for the founding of society, rights theorists such as Grotius
gradually articulated the insight that language itself entails certain
obligations. On the basis of this normative view of language, they then
argued that a linguistic contract-a contract about the meaning and right
use of language-is the precondition of all other contracts.
Drawing on a range of classical, patristic, and humanist texts, Grotius
represents language as the sign of our rational and sociable nature.25 Like
Cicero, Grotius sometimes confidently asserts that man has "an impelling
desire for society, for the gratification of which he alone among animals
possesses a special instrument, speech (sermonem)."'26 He spells out the
implications of this view in his discussion of good faith in Book 3. Here
Grotius goes so far as to criticize Cicero's opinion that promises could be
broken in exceptional cases.27 Although lying might be permitted in
wartime, promises have a special status as a sign of our rationality: "From
the association of reason and speech arises that binding force of a promise
with which we are dealing."28
At other times, Grotius gives greater emphasis to the indispensable role
language played in eliciting our capacity for reason and sociability. Here
25. In his account of the relationship between language, society, and political association, Grotius
was influenced by Cicero, who offered two accounts of social and political association to his early
modem readers. In the rhetorical treatises, Cicero painted a picture of men wandering in a state of
nature until they were brought together by the powerful eloquence of a single individual. See CICERO,
DE INVENTIONE, at bk. 1, §§ 1.2-2.3 (H.M. Hubbell trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1976) (n.d.); CICERO,
DE ORATORE, at bk. 1, §§ 8.33-34 (E.W. Sutton & H. Rackhaus trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1967)
(n.d.). In these and other works, he also put forward an Aristotelian view of man's natural sociability,
and natural disposition to form political associations. See, e.g., CICERO, DE OFFICtIS, at bk. 1, §§ 4.12,
bk. 1, §§ 17.53-18.54 (Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (n.d.) [hereinafter CICERO, DE
OFFICIIS]. Thus, Cicero vacillated between descriptions of man's natural sociability and of a state of
nature in which men were asocial, irrational, and bellicose. He alternately described the gift of speech
as reflecting our reason or bringing it into being. The first account was predicated on natural law as the
source of right reason, while the second implied the arbitrary imposition of political order.
26. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 7.
27. Compare GROTUS, supra note 12, at bk. 3, ch. 19, § 2.1 with CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, supra note
25, at bk. 3, §§ 24.92 - 25.95.
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Grotius draws on, among others, Cicero's account of the linguistic origin
and preservation of society in De inventione. According to this account,
the eloquence of one man was necessary both to transform irrational "wild
savages into a kind and gentle folk," and-once society had been
established-to induce "those who had great physical strength to submit to
justice without violence."2 9 Moreover, Cicero goes on to argue, eloquence
also has a role to play in regulating violence itself. In a passage that could
describe Grotius's own ambitions, Cicero tells us that, after "eloquence
came into being and advanced to greater development.., in the greatest
undertakings of peace and war (in rebus pacis et belli) it served the
highest interests of mankind."3 ° Grotius proposes a similar role for
eloquence with regard to his savage and irrational contemporaries. As we
have seen, in the Prolegomena to De jure belli Grotius makes it clear that
the goal of his ambitious treatise is to subdue irrational force-to subdue
war itself-to the constraints of rational discourse.
In Dejure naturae et gentium Pufendorf follows Grotius's emphasis on
and interpretation of our capacity for speech:
This one fact alone might be sufficient proof that man was intended
by nature for a social life, namely, that he of all creatures has been
given the ability to express his thoughts to others by means of
articulate sound, which faculty can be of no logical use to men,
unless they lead a social life.3
Language, in other words, enables those verbal agreements which
facilitate the peaceful social relations dictated by natural law: "[T]he law
of nature commands, in a general way and indefinitely, that men enter into
agreements of some kind or other, since without them social relations and
peace between men could not be preserved."32 Accordingly, like Grotius,
Pufendorf argues that promises and agreements must be kept-pacta
29. CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 25, at bk. 1, § 2.3.
30. Id. Grotius refers directly to Cicero in a way that suggests that Cicero is one of the sources of
his title: "Cicero justly characterized as of surpassing worth a knowledge of treaties of alliance,
conventions, and understandings of peoples, kings, and foreign nations; a knowledge, in short, of the
whole law of war and peace (in omni denique bellijure &pacis)." GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 2.
The editor refers the reader to Cicero's speech FOR BALBUS, bk 6, § 15.
31. PUFENDORF, supra note 12, at bk. 4, ch. 1, § 1. One of Pufendorf s sources, as he make clear
in the very next sentence, is ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, at bk. I, ch. ii § 1.2, which says:
the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and likewise the
just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil,
ofjust and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a
state.
Id. See also PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 77 (James Tully ed., Michael
Silverthome trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1691) ("Everyone knows how useful, how simply
necessary, an instrument of human society language (sermo) is. Indeed, it has often been argued, on
the basis of this faculty alone, that man is intended to live a social life." And yet Pufendorfs
conception of sociability (like Grotius's) is not predicated on an Aristotelian account of virtue and of
political association. See generally SCHNEEW1ND, supra note 9.
32. PUFENDORF, supra note 12, at bk. 3, ch. 4, § 1.
Kahn
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servanda sunt-by referring not only to natural law but also to language
as proof of our social and moral obligations. Language provides both
evidence of, and a vehicle for, our natural disposition to peaceful and
faithful social relations.
Pufendorf makes an even stronger claim for the power of language to
bring reason and sociability into being when, like Grotius, he locates
speech at the dividing line between violence and law. Thus in his
discussion of "the natural state of man," Pufendorf quotes with approval
Horace's description in Book One of his Satires:
"When living beings first crawled on earth's surface, dumb brute
beasts, they fought for their acorns and their lair with nails and fists,
then with clubs, and so from stage to stage with the weapons which
need thereafter fashioned for them, until they discovered verbs and
nouns by which to make sounds express feelings. From that moment
they began to give up war, to build cities, and to frame laws .. .. "
In this genealogy of society, nouns and verbs replace clubs; the ability to
frame laws in language replaces the natural state of war. Language, in
short, brings into being an entirely new set of social and political relations
to which human nature was not originally inclined.
Accordingly, Pufendorf distinguishes between the minimal obligations
incumbent upon us by the "mere law of humanity," and those rights and
obligations created by "agreement or covenants":
[I]f mutual offices, the real fruit of humanity, are to be practised
more frequently between men, and by a kind of set rule, it was
necessary for men themselves to agree among themselves on the
mutual rendering of such services as a man could not also be certain
of for himself on the mere law of humanity. 34
Social relations are a linguistic artifact-specifically, an artifact of the
verbal contracts we enter into. In the examples that follow we see that
actual contracts exemplify the social, world-making capacities of
language; they supplement the natural duties of charity by creating new
rights and obligations 35; they bring society as we know it into being. In
support of this view Pufendorf cites Isocrates's view in Against
Callimachus that
treaties and pacts [foederibus et pactis] "have such effect, that most
of the affairs of life among both Greeks and barbarians are transacted
through pacts and covenants [pactis & conventis].... By means of
these we form contracts [commercia agitamus] with one another, and
33. PUFENDORF, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 2, 2 (quoting HORACE, SATIRES, at bk. 1, satire 3)
(n.d.).
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lay aside private enmities as well as general wars.""
In addition he quotes Aristotle's Rhetoric: "'If contracts are invalidated,
the intercourse of men is abolished."' 37 For these pragmatic reasons, as
well as because of the a priori moral law, Pufendorf subscribes to Cicero's
argument in De officiis that even villains need to keep faith with each
other.38
Although Grotius and Pufendorf both point to speech as evidence of our
natural reason and sociability-and thus of our natural obligation to keep
our promises-they also argue that a political contract is necessary
because our natural disposition was not enough to ensure peaceful and
faithful interaction. In these works, reflection on political obligation is
always shadowed by skepticism, by the conviction of sin, or by its secular
equivalent: the recognition that we are naturally prone to breach of
promise. Thus it was a short step from Grotius's and Pufendorf's
observations on the distinctively linguistic nature of human society to the
insight that a linguistic contract logically preceded the social or political
contract. Because political and other contracts are forged in language, part
of what is involved in making a contract is making language itself
dependable or calculable. A contract in language is inevitably also a
contract about the use of language--one that proscribes deceit,
equivocation and, in most cases, coercion. The possibility of binding
signification then becomes the precondition of binding oneself politically,
the precondition of the irrevocable transfer of rights.39
Grotius makes the connection between right linguistic usage and right
government at various points in De jure belli. The centerpiece of his
argument appears in Book 2, Chapter 16, On Interpretation. This chapter
is obviously indebted to earlier humanist legal scholars who, in their effort
to codify the norms of interpretation, gave increased attention to the rules
for the interpretation of Roman law found in Digest 50.16, de verborum
significatione.4 ° Like his humanist predecessors, Grotius was anxious to
36. Id. (quoting ISOCRATES, AGAINST CALLIMACHUS).
37. Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, at bk. 1, ch. xv [1376b10]).
38. See CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, supra note 25, at bk. 2, § 11.40 (The importance of justice is "so
great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of
justice."). Pufendorf is drawing here on GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 16, § 1, which includes
the example from Isocrates. Pufendorf comments approvingly, "if it were not necessary to keep
promises, it would be in no way possible with any confidence to base one's calculations on the
assistance of other men." PUFENDORF, supra note 12, at bk. 3, ch. 4, § 2. In this way Pufendorf finally
arrives at the dictum that it is "a most sacred precept of natural law.., that every man keep his given
word, that is, carry out his promises and agreements," id.; but it is notable that, like Grotius, he does so
by a series of pragmatic, even utilitarian arguments, drawn as much from Aristotle's and Cicero's
rhetorical works as from invocations of the moral law.
39. Hence the large place given by both Grotius and Pufendorf to the rules for the interpretation
of contracts-a feature usually not seen in late scholastic treatises and probably traceable to humanist
commentaries on Roman law, with their heightened attention to questions of language and
interpretation. On early modem legal interpretation, see note 41, infra.
40. See IAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF
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discover ways of constraining subjective intention, including criteria
regarding the "objective" or socially determined meaning of words.41 Even
more than his predecessors, Grotius was acutely aware of the political
implications of his attention to the norms of interpretation. In particular,
he tried to articulate a middle ground between tyranny and anarchy by
arguing that the meaning of an individual's consent to a contract,
including a political contract, is constrained by the social contract of
language.
Thus, to the fundamental question regarding political obligation-Must
we mean what we say?-Grotius answers a resounding yes:
If we consider only the one who has promised, he is under obligation
to perform, of his own free will, that to which he wished to bind
himself. "In good faith what you meant, not what you said, is to be
considered," says Cicero. But because internal acts are not of
themselves perceivable, and some degree of certainty must be
established, lest there should fail to be any binding obligation, in case
every one could free himself by inventing whatever meaning he
LAW 95-101 (1992).
41. On humanist jurisprudence, see KATHY EDEN, HERMENEUTICS AND THE RHETORICAL
TRADITION (1997); DONALD R. KELLEY, HISTORY, LAW, AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1984);
DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
(1990); LAN MACLEAN, supra note 40. Maclean demonstrates a pervasive concern in Renaissance legal
texts with objective and subjective criteria of interpretation, the first focussing on the meaning of the
words and the second on the intention of the speaker. He also shows that this distinction is untenable:
although most Renaissance authors assume "the priority of thought over language," they also assert
"the impossibility of thought without language." Id. at 146. Intention, that is, is only accessible
through language, through the interpretation of words that takes the form of other words. While
focussing on civil law, Maclean also demonstrates the existence of the same concerns in Sudrez's
theological treatise on law and in English legal thought, and comments:
This is on the one hand not surprising, as Roman law provides a precedent for legal thinking for
canonists and common lawyers alike and supplies many maxims useful to both; on the other
hand, it leaves the modem historian with the question whether the similarities of approach arise
out of a common legal outlook, or a common crisis about language which affected Renaissance
thinkers at more or less the same time.
Id. at 202. Maclean asserts that both explanations are likely.
Maclean also demonstrates the greater concern in Renaisssance texts than in their medieval
predecessors with the determination of subjective intention:
Verba, according to Aristotle and Cicero, are mental symbols or tokens (notae animi)
representing concepts which are common to all men .... By the late Renaissance, on the
authority of the Corpus [Juris Civilis] and of writers on forensic rhetoric, the definition ofverba
has been extended to read "notae return declarantes animi voluntatisque passiones et motus"
(symbols of things which express the passions and movements of the mind and will). The
introduction of subjective meaning is significant.... Its apparent exclusion in the medieval
period permitted the elaboration of a logic which treated only intellectus or thoughts and
ignored the word as an expression of feelings (motus animi) or perception (sensus, species).
Id. at 160-61. My reading of Grotius bears out Maclean's observations. Grotius and many of his
contemporaries argued both that the subject's intention was crucial to the binding force of political and
legal contracts, and that intention was constrained or dictated by the form of the contract itself. By
this, they seemed to mean something different from the scholastic view that the emphasis on intention
is compatible with objective obligations attendant upon the essence of a particular contract. Rather, for
early modem contract theorists, the form of the contract is viewed as a constraint on wayward
intention and equivocation.
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might wish, natural reason itself demands that the one to whom the
promise has been made should have the right to compel the promisor
to do what the correct interpretation suggests. For otherwise the
matter would have no outcome, a condition in which morals is held to
be impossible.42
In this passage Grotius both acknowledges and appears to depart from
the widespread medieval view that internal acts are perceivable by God
and morally binding for that reason.43 Instead, he imagines a world in
which morals are secured in the realm of interpersonal communication.
Confronting the ever-present possibility of deception and equivocation, he
asserts a public standard of meaning and accountability: Words should be
understood "according to current usage."" That is, while appealing to the
independent authority of natural reason, Grotius also locates that authority
in common linguistic practice-in the hope that language itself might
provide the ethical and interpretive guidelines which are "not of
themselves perceivable," and for which there is no more obvious
foundation.45
This characteristically early modern tension between subjective
intention and objective meaning-the objective constraints of language-
is also apparent in Grotius's discussion of promises in Book 2, Chapter 11
of De jure belli. In this chapter, Grotius argues against the French jurist
Connanus's view that some material proof or consideration is necessary
for an agreement to be binding. But even here, where Grotius is defending
the canon law principle that we are bound by our bare promises (promises
without consideration), he focusses not simply on the necessary
representation of the promise in language but also on the way language
constrains our meaning in ways we may not intend.46 According to
Grotius, to be able to promise is to be able to alienate one's actions or
42. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at ch. 2, bk. 16, § 1.1 (emphasis added); accord id. at bk. 2, ch. 13, §
1.1-5.
43. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 247 (1983).
44. "Populari ex usu." GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 16, § 2.
45. With his greater skepticism about the force of common usage, Hobbes provides an instructive
point of contrast. In DE CivE and LEVIATHAN Hobbes puts forward the radical claim that not just
understanding but also "truth... depends on men's consent and agreements" concerning the common
use of words. Agreements can take place once we agree about the meaning of "promise" and
"agreement." Yet he also cautions the reader not to rely on language alone: "[I]t is universally true of
language that although it rightly takes first place among the signs by which we disclose our ideas to
others, it cannot do the job on its own; it needs the help of a context [multarum circumstantiarum]."
HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN [DE CIVE] 219, 232 (Richard Tuck ed., Michael Silverthorne trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642); accord HOBBES, supra note 16. Context determines meaning,
however, only if the sovereign determines the context; otherwise there will be endless disputes
concerning proper meaning and proper ownership, and these disputes are tantamount to the state of
war.
46. See BERMAN, supra note 43, at 245-50 (discussing bare promises or nudapacta).
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freedom, just as we alienate or transfer our right to property.47 In Grotius's
account, the mechanism of such alienation-the way we secure our
promises-is language: We represent our intention by means of "external
signs." This analogy between the alienation of one's intention in language
and the alienation of property then informs Grotius's argument that one
can consent to permanent alienation of one's rights by means of an
irrevocable political contract. But this representation of our intention in
language may involve a different kind of alienation as well, as we see
when Grotius quotes Proverbs: "Thou art snared by the words of thy
mouth," and Ovid's Metamorphoses (Book 2, line 51), where Apollo
regrets his promise to Phaeton: "My word has become yours."'" In these
two examples, the emphasis is not so much on the way verbal promises
effectuate the will of the speaker as on the way language may bind the
speaker to express but nevertheless unintended terms.49
As the preceding has already suggested, to focus on the obligations that
language creates was not only to consider the relation of intention to the
social contract of meaning. It was also, necessarily, to take up the question
of performance. In his Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland,
Grotius argues,
The duty of keeping faith arises from speech or anything that
resembles speech. Speech is given to man alone amongst animals for
the better furtherance of their common interest in order to make
known what is hidden in the mind; the fitness whereof consists in the
correspondence of the sign with the thing signified, which is called
"truth." But since truth considered in itself implies nothing further
than the correspondence of the language with the mind at the actual
moment when the language is used, and since man's will is from its
nature changeable, means had to be found to fix that will for time to
come, and such means are called 'promise.' 50
Because our will is changeable, Grotius argues, we need to invent ways
to bind ourselves, to bind our intention to perform, and this self-binding
47. "The third way [of making a promise] is, where such a determination is confirmed by evident
signs of an intention to convey a peculiar right to another, which constitutes the perfect obligation of a
promise, and is attended with consequences similar to an alienation of property." GROTIUS, supra note
12, at bk. 2, ch. 11, § 4.1. This translation draws on the more fluent translation, GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS
OF WAR AND PEACE 134 (A.C. Campbell trans., M.W. Dunne 1901), as well as on Scott's edition.
48. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 11, § 4.1.
49. For the view that neoscholastic/natural law notions of contract saw no contrast between the
will and the terms of its expression in a contract, see GORDLEY, supra note 10, at 109:
Modem theories tend to set in opposition, on the one hand, the will of the parties, and on the
other any attempt by a court or legislature to judge the faimess of a contract. For the late
scholastics and the natural lawyers, there was no such radical opposition. To hold the parties to
the terms natural to the type of contract they entered into was to effectuate their will.
50. GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND 292-93 (R. W. Lee ed. & trans., 1926) quoted in
RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 69-70 (1979).
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takes the form of a promise or contract. Here language appears as a
condition of mortgaging the will. Language is what allows us to sustain
the fiction of an identical will-and of conscience-through time. As he
often does, Grotius is not so much working forward from the natural moral
law as working backward from language. For language to make sense,
promises have to be possible. It may not be too much to say that the power
of the will to bind itself is a consequence of language-of language
conceived of as the rational bond of society and as the tropological power
to transfer one's rights. In the Prolegomena to De jure belli Grotius
famously claims that even if we were to imagine (etiamsi daremus) that
God did not exist, we would still be bound by the dictates of natural law.
51
In light of the arguments we have surveyed, we can now recast Grotius's
formulation: "etiamsi daremus," even if we were to imagine that God did
not exist, language would still permit the transfer of rights and would still
dictate certain rational obligations. As Grotius says in the passage from
The Jurisprudence of Holland, our intentions are themselves bound by
language, not the other way around.52
But Grotius was not naive about the force of the linguistic contract. In
On Interpretation and elsewhere in Dejure belli it is clear that this force is
normative rather than actual: conventions of meaning cannot preclude
deception; instead, they provide the norm for the enforcement of promises.
At the same time, because norms are not the same as constraints, Grotius
also acknowledges the necessity of some kind of extra-linguistic
compulsion to enforce the common understanding: "the one to whom the
promise has been made should have the right to compel the promisor to do
what the correct interpretation suggests."5 3 The relevance to international
affairs is clear. According to Dejure belli, a just war is one that has been
precipitated by an international breach of promise or some other violation,
and that grants the injured party the "right to compel," the right to exercise
force against another nation.
In On the Duty of Man and Citizen Pufendorf is even more explicit
about the linguistic contract that precedes the political contract.5 4
51. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 11.
52. Hobbes also attributes a kind of binding force to language. Discussing the second law of
nature, "Stand by your agreements, or keep faith," Hobbes remarks commonsensically that
"agreements would be pointless if we did not stand by them:"
For in making an agreement, one denies by the very act of agreeing that the act is
meaningless.... Anyone therefore who makes agreement with someone, but does not believe
he is obliged to keep faith with him, believes that making agreements is meaningless and at the
same time meaningful, and that is absurd. Therefore either one should keep faith with every one
or one should not make agreements.
HOBBES, supra note 45, at 44 (ch. 3). Yet, for Hobbes, the injunction in the last sentence betrays
the fact that the binding power of language is hypothetical, or rather contingent upon the power of
the sovereign to enforce our agreements.
53. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 16, § 1.1 (emphasis added).
54. PUFENDORF, supra note 31.
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According to Pufendorf, we incur "a double obligation by using
[language] whether in speech or in writing":
The first is that users of a given language ... must employ the same
words for the same objects following the usage of that language. For
since neither sounds nor particular letter-shapes naturally signify
anything (for if they did, all languages or forms of writing would
necessarily converge), the use of language would become
meaningless if everyone could give an object any name he wanted.
To prevent this, it is necessary for a tacit agreement [tacitam
conventionem] to be made among users of the same language to
denote each thing with one particular word and not another.... The
second obligation involved in the use of language is that in speaking
to someone one should disclose the sense of one's mind to him in
such a way that he may clearly know it."
Like Grotius, Pufendorf argues in Dejure naturae et gentium that there
is an implicit social contract regarding both the meaning and the well-
intentioned use of signs. The imposition of meaning is established by
consent, agreement, and pact. Linguistic connotation is also a function of
social interaction, for words gain accessory meanings as "an expression of
our judgment or passion and esteem."56 He asserts that the social
agreement regarding the right usage of words is dictated by the law of
nature, which forbids deceit by the use of signs.57 But he also casts this
argument in terms of the "right" (jus) not to be deceived, attendant upon
the conventions of language.58 In On the Duty of Man and Citizen
Pufendorf goes further, arguing that such linguistic rights are themselves
socially constituted, thus changeable: here he justifies various forms of
equivocation or lying in terms of their conformity to social concerns or
what he calls "moral truth."59 Like Grotius, then, Pufendorf vacillates
between arguing that the moral obligation to keep our promises is dictated
by substantive natural law and that it is created by linguistic convention
itself.6" It is the latter argument that is of particular interest to our post-
foundationalist world.
In addition to proto-anthropological rights talk and the linguistic
contract, there is a third and final way in which early modem reflection on
the political contract anticipates modem rights talk. As I mentioned
before, the early modem emphasis on the linguistic constitution of rights
can be interpreted as a response to skepticism about the legibility of
55. Id., at bk. 1, ch. 10, § 2-3.
56. PUFENDORF, supra note 12, at bk. 4, ch. 1, § 5-6.
57. See id at bk. 3, ch. 4, § 2; bk. 4, ch. 1, § 1.
58. See id at bk. 4, ch. 1, § 10.
59. PUFENDORF, supra note 31, at bk. 1, ch. 10, § 7.
60. See GROTIUS, supra note 12, at bk. 2, ch. 13, §§ 1-5, bk. 2, ch. 16, § 1.1-2.
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natural law or as an attempt to stress the historically contingent activities
of persuasion and negotiation in response to the lethal conflicts generated
by the wars of religion. In either case, early modem rights talk is
characterized, in Bloch's words, by "the belief in the power of a logical
construction," the belief that we can only know what we have made or
constructed ourselves.6 Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke, all in their
different ways, articulated versions of this belief. In De Homine, Hobbes
asserts that "politics and ethics ... can be demonstrated a priori; because
we ourselves make the principles."62 Pufendorf puts forward a view of
moral (as opposed to natural) entities as specifically human inventions or
constructions; and Locke asserts in a similar vein that, like God, man has a
maker's knowledge and natural right in "the work of his hands" and other
intentional actions.63
This emphasis on construction has usually been interpreted in terms of
mathematical models of cognition. Bloch's comment on the belief in
logical construction is typical: "This is an essential trait of modem
bourgeois thought since its inception: It knows only that which has been
rationally produced, and it must be able to be reconstructed logically from
its elements and foundations.... Here mathematics provided the
model. '64 There is certainly plenty of evidence that Hobbes thought of his
political theory in this way, and Grotius, too, claimed scientific precision
for his analysis of natural rights.65 But the preceding analysis suggests an
alternative interpretation of the power of construction, one that focusses
on the constitutive power of language. Following in the footsteps of their
humanist predecessors, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke all
developed to different degrees the analogy between God the creator and
man the maker, not least of all in terms of the linguistic power of creation
first instanced in the divine fiat: let us make man in our image and
likeness.66 In their historical account of rights talk, Grotius and Pufendorf
61. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 55.
62. HOBBES, DE HOMINE 42 (ch. 10, § 5) (Bernard Gert, T. S. K. Scott-Craig & Charles T. Wood
trans., 1972) (1668).
63. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, at bk. 2, ch. 5, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
On the role of the workmanship metaphor in Locke, see SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 103-10, drawing in
part on JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES (1980). On
the role of construction in Pufendorf, see J. B. Schneewind, Pufendorf's Place in the History of Ethics,
72 SYNTHtSE (1987); Alfred Dufour, Pufendorf, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT 1450-1700, at 566 (J. H. Bums & Mark Goldie eds., 1991). For Pufendorf "moral entities
are inventions, some of them divine, most of them human. But Pufendorf does not think that their
status as constructions gives us any reason to doubt their force and efficacy." Alfred Dufour
characterizes Pufendorfs "new theory of power in which all kinds of authority were grounded in
agreement or free consent," as "conventionalism." Dufour, supra at 130. Ultimately, however, in
Pufendorf's account the validity of these conventions depends on the will of God.
64. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 55.
65. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at para. 58.
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in particular suggest that a similar fiat is at work in the declaration of
rights. The innovation of at least some early modem theories of political
contract, as P. S. Atiyah has correctly observed, is not "the idea of a
relationship involving mutual rights and duties," but rather the idea that
contract creates and sustains this relationship by means of the free choice
of individuals.67 The same could be said of the relationship between the
linguistic contract and mutual rights: What distinguishes the early modem
from the medieval period is not so much the idea of natural rights, which
had a prior life in medieval philosophy, but the idea that such rights might
be created and sustained by our linguistic agreement, without any other
foundation.68
I am not suggesting that early modem contractarians are theorists of
modem human rights. Among the many theoretical and practical reasons
this could not be the case (some of which I have explored above) is the
simple fact that early modem rights talk was perfectly compatible, in the
minds of many of its proponents, with political absolutism. I am also not
suggesting that simply failing to understand the history of rights talk must
result in unsuccessful modem discussions of rights. But, in attempting to
deal with the seventeenth-century equivalent of a crisis of
foundationalism, Grotius and Pufendorf do have something to contribute
to our modem debates. Specifically, they provide both a historical
corrective and a methodological alternative to modem accounts of rights.
Although a full treatment of the implications of early modem rights talk
for modem debates cannot be undertaken here, it is clear that Grotius and
Pufendorf challenge the consensus discussed at the beginning of this
essay, a consensus that defines liberalism (both then and now) in terms of
a pre-social essentialist version of the self; ahistorical individual rights;
and ahistorical, universally valid natural laws. In the alternative genealogy
I am suggesting, at least some early modem rights talk looks forward to
modem attempts to define the liberal self as already embedded in culture
and language, as constituted through an ongoing series of interpersonal
relations.69 It also looks forward to efforts to locate rights somewhere
67. P.S. ATiYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 41 (1979).
68. As I have indicated, this constructivist or, at its extreme, anti-foundationalist view of rights is
in tension, in early modem texts, with the belief in objective natural law. Yet, it was also possible to
hold that rights were created by rational agreement but only received their obligatory force from the
existence of a divine creator. On this distinction in Locke, see TULLY, supra note 13, at ch. 9.
69. Such a view of the self could arguably make room in liberalism for collective as well as
individual rights. See Maleiha Malik, Communal Goods as Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN RIGHTS 138, 154, 159-60 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996). Malik is discussing
the communitarian dimension of the work of liberal theorists WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM,
COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); and CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION (1992). For a compelling analysis of the interpersonal dimension of the liberal self
and the social promise of contract, with particular reference to nineteenth-century American literature
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between positivism and the metaphysics of natural law, in the in-between
space of conversation.7"
The contemporary relevance of the early modem focus on the discursive
dimension of rights is suggested by Thomas Haskell's article The Curious
Persistence of Rights Talk in the "Age of Interpretation." Haskell argues
(against Leo Strauss on the one hand, and Nietzsche on the other) that it is
still possible to talk about rights, even once one has accepted the
historicist critique of positivism. Whereas Strauss and Nietzsche agreed
that rights needed a metaphysical foundation in natural law (which for
Strauss was at least desirable and for Nietzsche impossible), Haskell
suggests that we think about rights as conventions:
Rights need not be either eternal or universal, but if they are to do us
any good, they must be rooted deeply enough in the human condition
to win the loyalty of more than a few generations (and ideally, more
than a few cultures). Conventions possess the requisite durability.7
Haskell concedes that
[R]ights as rational conventions will lack some of the qualities that
have traditionally been claimed for rights.... Far from being fixed
once and for all in a constitution or a bill of rights, the definition of
rights will be a perpetual object of contention between rival groups
with strong vested interests, both ideal and material, in one
interpretation or another.72
Although Haskell makes a compelling case for the continued
significance of rights talk in the absence of metaphysical foundations, he
devotes little attention to language. Here, it is useful to turn to the work of
Claude Lefort and JUrgen Habermas. For Lefort, the very idea of human
rights implies the disentangling of the notion of right from that of power,
and this in turn means that "the source of right" is "the human utterance of
right"73 :
Modem democracy invites us to replace the notion of a regime
70. See Owen M. Fiss, Human Rights as Social Ideals, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL
TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 263, 273, 275 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999). See
also THOMAS, supra note 69, at 45 ("Works of realism.., challenge the formalism of contract law by
presenting promising as an interpersonal act that is grounded neither in a scientific appeal to the laws
of nature nor a moral appeal to God's witness."). Thomas's analysis of the novel's anti-foundationalist
account of contracting has antecedents in early modem attempts to formulate an account of obligation
in the absence of any legible, substantive natural law.
71. Haskell, supra note 8, at 1104-05.
72. Id. at 1005. Interestingly, although Haskell stresses interpretation and gestures ironically
towards "literocentrism," he does not accord much weight to language itself. Yet in a final,
appreciative analysis of Thomas Kuhn's work on the interpretive conventions of scientific
communities, he quotes Kuhn on language itself as the basis of any objectivity we have. See id at
1010-11.
73. Claude Lefort, Human Rights and the Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY
37 (David Macey trans., 1988).
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governed by laws, of a legitimate power, by the notion of a regime
founded upon the legitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate and
what is illegitimate-a debate which is necessarily without any
guarantor and without any end. The inspiration behind both the rights
of man and the spread of rights in our day bears witness to that
debate.74
To rephrase Lefort in Grotius's terms, rhetorical controversiae may
profitably substitute for physical conflict; in fact, it is only when speech
replaces violence that rights can appear. A similar argument is put forward
by Jiirgen Habermas in his article Multiculturalism and the Liberal State.
Habermas criticizes what he calls "the liberal assumption that human
rights are prior to popular sovereignty. . . . The addressees of law," he
argues, "must be in a position to see themselves at the same time as
authors of those laws to which they are subject." " And this means that
"[i]t must be up to the citizens themselves to debate and deliberate in
public, and to have parliaments democratically decide, on the kinds of
rights they regard as necessary for the protection of both private liberties
and public participation."76 If this notion of democratic deliberation is a
far cry from the early modem rights talk of Grotius, Hobbes, and
Pufendorf, the insight that rights are created in and by language is not.
As I have argued, Grotius's attempt to think of language as both the
result of a contract and as the enabling condition of any individual
contract is one part of this alternative genealogy. In placing the linguistic
contract at the center of his account of political obligation, Grotius stresses
the mutual dependence of the "sovereign subject" who freely enters into a
contract and the social and linguistic conventions that enable the subject to
communicate, that is, to make sense. This analysis of the way in which
language both enables and constrains the individual speaking subject
might ultimately lead one to reject the metaphor of the contract, with its
attendant voluntarism and its talk of individual rights, as inappropriate. In
the terms of one modem critic, we could then say that Grotius ultimately
helps us see that "the contract of language is not one that is freely entered
into by autonomous and sovereign speakers"; "no speaker has the right to
74. Id. at 39.
75. JUrgen Habermas, Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, STAN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1995).
76. Id. at 851. This elevation of speech is not the same thing as the elevation of opinion or
contingent interests. See LEFORT, supra note 73, at 38, 41 ("right cannot be immanent within the
social order without the very idea of right being debased"). On the establishment of right through the
discourse of rights, see also NORBERTO BOBBIo, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1996), who also stresses the
necessary protection of rights by the coercive power of the state; and RICHARD FLATHMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 6-7, 185 (1976). The notion that the declaration of rights is performative-that it
actually helps constitute the rights to which it refers-is widespread in contemporary discussions of
international human rights. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 70; Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS, supra note 70; Ruti Teitel, Millenial Visions: Human Rights at
Century's End, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS, supra note 70.
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recede from the contract... except at the price of ceasing to be a speaker
at all."'77 But rather than equate this irrevocable linguistic contract with
political repression and social control, we might instead want to hold onto
the Grotian model of the linguistic contract as an emblem of "the
negotiated character of social knowledge," and thus the ever-present
possibility of renegotiating social and political relations through rights
talk.7 ' For this reason, as I have argued, modem critics and defenders of
liberalism would do well to look again at the early modem period, which
offers us a richer and more contested legacy of rights talk than the usual
histories of liberalism would suggest.
77. CHRISTOPHER PRENDERGAST, THE ORDER OF MIMESIS 37 (1986).
78. Id. at 41. Prendergast does not discuss rights talk, though he does elaborate the parallel
between the social contract and the contract of mimesis. In the early modem period, Grotius provided
ammuntion both to those who supported absolute monarchy and those who, like Locke, argued that the
contract with the sovereign was by definition revocable. See TUCK, supra note 50, at ch. 7.
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